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In 2003, Blackwater, a private military company (PMC)1, won a securities contract 
from the United States government for $21 million to protect members of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) following the invasion of Iraq (Gillan 2009). Since that 
time, in its various contracts with the U.S. State Department, Blackwater would earn 
more than $1 billion for its security services (Gillan 2009). However, the PMC would 
also become entangled in controversy through its involvement in nearly 200 shootings 
from 2005 to 2009 (Gillan 2009). One example which occurred in 2007, involved the 
killing of 17 civilians in Baghdad’s Nisour Square (Gillan 2009). This resulted in a 
Congressional investigation and has led many to question the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of utilizing PMCs in overseas military operations (Broder and Knowlton 
2007; Gillan 2009). 
Since the 1990s, PMCs and their use by states has increased (Singer 2003; 
Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). For example, evident in U.S. operations in Afghanistan, 
the United States has been heavily reliant on the use of PMCs during the Global War on Terror. 
                                                          




In 2012, the number of private contractors stationed in Afghanistan reached an all-time 
high of approximately 117,000 (Peters and Plagakis 2019). At the same time, roughly 
88,000 U.S. soldiers were deployed in the state (Peters and Plagakis 2019). Between the 
2008 and 2017 fiscal years, the level of U.S. troops rarely exceeded those of private 
contractors (Peters and Plagakis 2019). In 2017, it was estimated that there were more 
than double the number of private contractors in Afghanistan than there were U.S. forces 
(Peters and Plagakis 2019). 
Previous literature has largely focused on the status of PMCs under international 
humanitarian law and the need for regulation within the industry (Cameron 2006; Carney 
2006; Doswald-Beck 2007). The relatively-undefined and nonspecific status of PMCs 
under a multitude of U.N. articles and conventions has led to an abundance of scholarly 
debate regarding the legal definition of these actors (Millard 2003; Cameron 2006; 
Doswald-Beck 2007). In turn, this has led to discussion regarding the domestic and 
international regulation of PMCs through contractual obligation and the use of oversight 
by third-party actors (Carney 2006).  
Additionally, the literature discusses the ability of PMCs to increase conflict 
severity, within states experiencing civil conflict, by increasing the military effectiveness 
of the client (Petersohn 2017). However, there is a dearth of literature on the specific 
relationships between PMCs and the duration of conflict. In one of the only articles on 
the subject, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) argue that competition between PMCs 
during civil conflict is important because, without it, these actors may exploit the limited 
monitoring capabilities of clients. When hired by the governments experiencing civil 
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conflict, competition among PMCs is found to decrease conflict duration (Akcinaroglu 
and Radziszewski 2012).  
Despite this, it is still unknown if the mere presence of PMCs within civil conflict, 
whether hired by government or rebels, contribute to conflict duration – as no known 
literature examines this effect. To resolve this gap in the literature, I focus on PMCs in 
Africa and analyze the relationship between conflict duration and the contracting of 
security services by governments and rebel groups. Because of the increased use of 
PMCs in intrastate and international conflicts (Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012; Petersohn 2017), this study will contribute to existing literature by 
further exploring the effect of PMCs on conflict duration.  
In this thesis, I review the literature pertaining to third-party interventions within 
civil conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002a; 2002b; Balch-Lindsay et 
al. 2008) and the domestic conditions influencing conflict duration (Fearon 2004; Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2004). In addition, I examine the current literature 
describing the effects of PMCs on conflict duration (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 
2012; Petersohn 2017; Faulkner 2017). I then test this relationship by conducting a 
multivariate analysis using a Cox proportional hazards model. I find that PMCs, when 
contracted by either government or rebel forces, have no effect on the duration of civil 
conflict. Despite these findings, this study is of importance as it finds that the effects of 
PMCs on conflict duration may not be as pronounced as the literature assumes. However, 
because the use of PMCs in weak or failed states could lead to these actors becoming the 
most able and lethal military force within a region (Singer 2003), this topic may soon 








Until recently, the impacts of PMCs on civil conflict duration appear not to have 
been assessed quantitatively. Instead, much of the relevant literature has studied the role 
of third-party intervention – meaning the effect of external actors in civil conflict - and its 
effects on the duration of civil conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002a; 
2002b; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008). This literature provides a range of empirical findings 
giving credence to the circumstances third-party interventions are effective in reducing 
conflict duration. Because the definition of third-party interveners is not strictly defined, 
the findings of this literature can be useful in studying the intervening effects of PMCs on 
the duration of conflict. Included within the civil war literature, scholars also discuss and 
provide evidence for a variety of domestic factors affecting the duration of civil conflict. 
Because the focus of this thesis is of civil conflict, this literature will aid in determining 
both the factors and conditions associated with conflict duration. 
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INTERVENERS IN CIVIL CONFLICT 
Third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts are a heavily-studied section of the 
civil war literature (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002a; 2002b; Balch-
Lindsay et al. 2008). Often described as economic or military involvement by an outside 
actor (Regan 2002b), these interventions are described as ineffective in their ability to 
decrease conflict duration. In fact, both economic and military intervention are associated 
with increased conflict duration – especially when either type of intervention alone is 
relied upon for conflict cessation (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002b). 
Reliance on only economic intervention often fails to change the “cost-benefit 
calculations of the antagonists” due to the costs incurred throughout the conflict (Regan 
1996, 347). The sole use of military intervention by third parties is ineffective because 
“the role of affective motivations will take on a higher salience to the combatants, 
making outside participants either largely irrelevant or a target and a cause to continue 
the struggle” (Regan 1996, 347). However, by utilizing a mixed strategy –  meaning the 
use of both military and economic intervention – third-party interveners are able to 
simultaneously affect both the costs of continued fighting and the anticipated benefits of 
conflict cessation (Regan 1996). In turn, this strategy is associated with a decrease in 
conflict duration (Regan 1996). 
In addition, the literature discusses the effects of biased interventions – third-party 
intervention in support of either the government or rebel group; and neutral interventions 
– third-party intervention without declared support to any one party (Regan 2002b). 
Collier et al. (2004) find biased third-party interventions on behalf of rebel groups to 
result in a decrease in conflict duration. The authors suggest that with sufficient military 
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support, government forces can be defeated because rebel groups are able to conceal 
themselves. Regan (2002b) finds that biased third-party interventions are associated with 
shorter conflict duration. This may occur because third-parties may only intervene in 
cases where they believe intervention will end the conflict in their favor (Regan 2002b). 
Furthermore, Regan (2002b) finds that neutral third-party interventions, when compared 
to biased interventions, dramatically increase time until conflict cessation. In explaining 
this finding, Regan (2002b) provides two arguments: (1) third-parties are not always 
impartial mediators and (2) remaining impartial may not be sufficient in convincing 
warring actors to forgo hostilities. 
Unlike Collier et al. (2004) and Regan (2002b), Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 
(2008) and Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) find that biased military interventions increase 
conflict duration. In explaining this discrepancy, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2008) 
argue that when a third-party intervener commits resources to one party within a conflict, 
other third-parties are encouraged “to counterbalance these contributions by committing 
resources to the opposite side in the conflict” (Findley and Teo 2006; Balch-Lindsay and 
Enterline 2008, 632). The explanation of Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2008) is similar to 
the findings on simultaneous third-party interventions – described as countervailing 
intervention on behalf of both parties engaged in conflict. Simultaneous third-party 
interventions are reported to increase conflict duration by providing continued motivation 
for warring parties to continue hostilities and increase time until negotiated settlement 
(Regan 2002b; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008). 
The timing of third-party intervention within intrastate conflict is of equal 
importance to the type and form of intervention and can significantly aid in conflict 
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termination (Regan and Aydin 2006). Regan and Aydin (2006) find that diplomatic 
interventions during the “middle stages of conflict” are effective in resolving intrastate 
conflict (749). This occurs because third-party interveners, at a certain point in the 
conflict, are able to “more effectively communicate information about the utility of 
continued fighting and the terms of potential settlements to warring parties” (Regan and 
Aydin 2006, 742). These findings are contrary to the results of Regan and Stam (2000), 
who conclude intervention in intrastate disputes is most effective during early and later 
stages. Furthermore, third-party interventions supporting government opposition during 
the early onset of conflict are found to increase duration by shifting “the balance of 
capabilities towards parity” (Regan 2002, 61).  
 
DOMESTIC FACTORS IN CIVIL CONFLICT 
Although third-party interventions are found to influence the outcomes of civil 
conflict, the literature also examines the effects of certain domestic factors on conflict 
duration (Fearon 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2004). Ethnic 
fractionalization, described as the probability that two randomly-selected individuals are 
from different ethnolinguistic and religious groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003), is an 
important factor described within the civil war literature. Fearon (2004) finds ethnic 
fractionalization to increase civil war duration (287). Collier et al. (2004) find the effects 
of ethnic fractionalization on conflict duration most significant when approximately “two 
or three large ethnic groups” are present within the society, and the level of ethnic 
fractionalization is approximately equal (263). Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find similar results with intermediate levels of ethnic 
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fractionalization attributing to an increase in conflict duration. Furthermore, Collier et al. 
(2004) determine that higher levels of national diversity reduce social cohesion among 
rebel groups – causing a decrease in conflict duration. Lower levels of ethnic diversity 
are associated with an increase in social cohesion among rebel groups through the 
creation of ethnic group affiliations – causing an increase in conflict duration (Collier et 
al. 2004). 
Mentioned within the civil war literature, the geographical terrain of a state is 
often found as having an impact on conflict duration (Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Collier 
et al. 2004). Mountainous and forested regions are described as offering rebel groups 
“safe haven” and opportunity to reorganize and rearm before reengaging government 
forces (Collier et al. 2004). Although emphasizing the importance of geographical terrain, 
Collier and Hoeffler (1999) and Collier et al. (2004) find no support for the relationship 
between mountainous or forested terrain and conflict duration. In addressing this finding, 
the authors suggest that when conflicts are escalated to a “substantial scale,” the conflict 
can be sustained regardless of geography (Collier et al. 2004, 266). However, Lujala 
(2010) finds that mountainous terrain and rainy seasons decrease the duration of conflict. 
This occurs because mountains provide locations to conceal forces, and rainy seasons 
may damage roads and isolate the warring parties.   
The literature identifies a relationship between the ability of rebel groups to 
access natural resources and conflict duration (Collier 1999; Collier et al. 2004; Fearon 
2004; Lujala 2010). Fearon (2004) and Collier et al. (2004) find that natural resources 
controlled by rebel movements allow for a source of revenue to finance rebellion – thus 
increasing the duration of conflict. Furthermore, conflict duration may be influenced by 
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rebel group investment in the illicit sale of natural resources leading to the acquisition of 
the weapons and materials required to gain a competitive edge on government forces 
(Fearon 2004; Collier et al. 2004). However, the geographic location of these natural 
resources is important in determining their impact on conflict duration (Lujala 2010). 
Heavily noted within the literature, certain economic factors are shown to 
significantly contribute to an increase in conflict duration (Collier 1999; Collier et al. 
2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier et 
al. (2004) cite low per capita income as contributing to increased conflict duration by 
decreasing the opportunity costs of conflict. Fearon (2004) suggests low per capita 
income increases civil war duration by supporting ethnic conflict and the financing of 
contraband. Collier et al. (2004), further discussing the effects of domestic economic 
conditions on conflict duration, find high income inequality to increase conflict duration 
by proxy of “the difference between the victory and defeat payoffs” and lowering the cost 
of recruitment for rebel groups (262). 
 
THE FIRM IN CIVIL CONFLICT 
 Due to the involvement of PMCs in civil conflict, literature pertaining to third-
party interventions and the domestic factors influencing conflict duration are of 
importance to the study of PMCs. However, the effects of PMCs on the duration of civil 
conflict is a widely under-documented area of the literature (Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012). In addressing this oversight, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) 
study the effects of competition between PMCs on the duration of civil conflict in 
African. In their research, the authors seek to determine “when these companies can be 
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agents of insecurity and when their presence can generate positive dividends for peace” 
(815). Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) find that when PMCs are hired by the 
government, competition between firms is associated with a decrease in conflict duration. 
This occurs because governments in the post-Cold War era often hire multiple PMCs, 
thus creating competition in delivery of the services requested by the client (Akcinaroglu 
and Radziszewski 2012). This produces desirable results on behalf of the client and aids 
in the efficient delivery of firm services, as anything less could hamper the firm’s ability 
to acquire future contracts with the government (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). 
Furthermore, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) find that when hired by a rebel 
group, competition between PMCs is not enough to guarantee rebel victory and decrease 
conflict duration. 
 Competition is not the only factor influencing the behavior of PMCs in favor of 
conflict termination. Strategic privatization is the selling of natural resources by the 
government to the PMC as payment for security services (Singer 2003). Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski (2012) find that when receiving payment for services through concessions 
to extract natural resources, PMCs are driven to deliver decisive victory for the 
government. Because microeconomic theory holds all firms seek to maximize profits, a 
peaceful environment allows the PMC to achieve this goal (Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012). If the resource being sold is under rebel control, the PMC must 
attack the government’s opposition to receive payment (Singer 2003). Upon success of 
the PMC in gaining control of the natural resource, the rebel group is then deprived of a 




 Because PMCs have increasingly become more involved in conflict for the past 
two decades, a common view is that these actors routinely increase the severity of armed 
conflict (Petersohn 2017). By establishing a relationship between military effectiveness 
and conflict severity, Petersohn (2017) finds that PMCs increase conflict severity within 
failed or weakened states. PMCs are recruited to increase the military effectiveness of the 
client by contributing to the fighting capability of standing forces and improving military 
responsiveness to combat operations – thus contributing to an increase in conflict severity 
(Petersohn 2017). However, the increase in conflict severity is not due to the PMCs 
“particular bloodlust” for conflict, but instead the firm fulfilling the negotiated 
contractual obligations and increasing the client’s ability to neutralize opposition forces 
(Petersohn 2017, 1066). 
By noting the differential effects of PMC security services, Petersohn (2017) finds 
that not all services offered by PMCs are equally effective in increasing the military 
capabilities and responsiveness of the government’s standing forces. Offering the greatest 
increase in military capability and responsive, PMCs specializing in armed services can 
directly contribute to the client’s forces by introducing additional soldiers and advanced 
battlefield tactics, conducting air-to-ground strikes, and establishing command-and-
control systems (Petersohn 2017). These security services further enable the client’s 
standing forces to launch offensive operations by supporting the availability of resources 
– resulting in an increase in conflict severity (Petersohn 2017).  
 Commonly provided to foreign forces, PMCs which specialize in providing 
consultancy and training serve to improve both the military capability and responsiveness 
of the client (Petersohn 2017). Unlike PMCs specializing in armed combat, firms 
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dedicated to providing consultancy and training services do not directly contribute to the 
client’s military capabilities (Petersohn 2017). Instead, by providing a focus on 
improving the current state of the client’s standing forces, these PMCs enable current 
forces to conduct “elaborate battlefield maneuvers and better adjust to opponent tactics” 
(Petersohn 2017, 1050). By improving the client’s ability to eliminate the opposition and 
broaden combat operations, the services of consultancy and training contribute to an 
increase in conflict severity – although to a lesser extent (Petersohn 2017, 1050) 
 Improving only the responsiveness of the client’s military forces, PMCs 
specializing in intelligence gathering are contracted to provide “commanders with a 
clearer picture of the enemy’s positions and intentions” (Petersohn 2017, 1050). By 
allowing the client’s standing forces to adjust offensive or defensive operations, soldiers 
are better able to counter the opposition (Petersohn 2017). Due to an increase in military 
effectiveness, the intelligence gathering services offered by PMCs are found to increase 
the severity of conflict. However, because these security services only address the 
responsiveness of the client’s forces, conflict severity will increase less than both armed 
security and consultancy and training services (Petersohn 2017). 
Having no effect on either the military capability or responsiveness of the client, 
PMCs providing logistics and support services “improve the availability and quality of 
weapon systems and the logistics chain” (Petersohn 2017, 1050). By providing 
efficiency, PMCs engaging in logistics and support services allow the client’s military to 
properly maintain weaponry and bolster “weapons-ready ratios” by reducing maintenance 
cycles (Petersohn 2017, 1050). By managing support functions, PMCs are able to reduce 
the number of client forces dedicated to logistics and support tasks (Petersohn 2017). In 
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turn, this increases the number of client forces available for assignment to combat duties 
(Petersohn 2017). Despite this, Petersohn (2017) finds PMCs specializing in logistics and 
support services have no effect on conflict severity. This is because logistics and support 
services “do not directly translate to improved war-fighting skills,” but instead contribute 
to resource expansion and availability (Petersohn 2017, 1050). The decrease in military 
effectiveness of PMCs providing logistics and support services may be attributable to the 
preoccupation of client forces with unrelated war-fighting tasks and the inability of the 
client to effectively utilize enhanced weapon systems (Petersohn 2017). 
The civil war literature describes the impacts of third parties on the survivability of peace 
post-conflict (Lo et al. 2008). While not directly related to the subject of this thesis, 
PMCs do have an effect on post-conflict peace duration (Faulkner 2017). Faulkner (2017) 
suggests firm variation in security services can alter rebel group perceptions regarding the 
relative capabilities of the government – thus influencing the probability civil conflict 
will reemerge. In particular, Faulkner (2017) finds that PMC security services involving 
the use of armed combat increase the likelihood of commitment problems among rebel 
groups in the post-conflict environment. This occurs because, in an already delicate 
peace-agreement process, rebel groups may attribute defeat to the PMCs involvement 
within the conflict – thus making the post-conflict environment even more unsteady 
(Faulkner 2017). PMCs engaging in the use of consultancy and training security services, 
by forgoing direct engagement with the rebel group, improve the duration of peace post-






THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Unfortunately, previous literature studying the relationship between PMCs and 
civil conflict is largely incomplete. Petersohn (2017) concludes PMCs contribute to an 
increase in conflict severity by increasing the military effectiveness of the government. 
However, the author offers no evidence to determine if the increase in conflict severity 
affects conflict duration – as this falls outside the scope of the intended research. In 
addition, although finding PMCs increase the military effectiveness of government 
clients, Petersohn (2017) overlooks whether PMCs can increase the military effectiveness 
of rebel groups. In turn, this further contributes to the gap in literature regarding the 
relationship between PMCs and rebel groups. 
In one of the only pieces of literature connecting PMCs to conflict duration, 
Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) rely upon competition between firms as the 
independent variable responsible for conflict duration. Although the findings presented 
by the authors contribute to the existing literature, the analysis of how firm competition 
affects conflict duration introduces further gaps within the literature. By ignoring 
variation among the services provided by PMCs, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) 
inadvertently overstate the effects of competition on conflict duration. Rather, because
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Petersohn (2017) finds that certain security services increase military effectiveness, 
competition is likely only between PMCs providing similar security services (Lowery 
and Gray 1995; Nemeth 2014). 
While it is important to understand how competition among PMCs may influence 
conflict duration, the literature first must explain how the simple presence of PMCs 
impacts the duration of conflict. By removing Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski’s (2012) 
variable for competition and replacing it with presence, I argue that PMCs have an effect 
on the duration of civil conflict and that these effects will differ depending on whether 
the client is a government or a rebel group. In doing so, I propose two mechanisms by 
which this occurs. First, through power aggregation, PMCs impact the duration of 
conflict by supplementing the standing forces of the government or the rebel group. 
Second, the informational asymmetry between the PMC and the client, whether it is a 
government or a rebel group, also affects conflict duration. By utilizing these two 
mechanisms, I expect PMCs to decrease conflict duration when contracted by a 
government and increase conflict duration when contracted by a rebel group. 
 
ASSUMPTIONS OF PMCs 
Before exploring the effects of PMC presence on conflict duration, I establish a 
set of assumptions regarding the behavior of these firms. I will use these assumptions to 
define the relationship between PMCs and conflict duration. In addition, these 
assumptions will serve to address the theorized effects of PMCs on both government 
actors and rebel groups. 
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First, I assume PMCs, as with all organizations, are rational actors seeking to 
further their own self-interests (Wilson 1995; Singer 2002; 2003; Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012). As with all firms in the study of microeconomics, PMCs are 
market-driven businesses subject to the goal of any firm: the maximization of profits 
(Koplin 1963; Singer 2002; 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). In pursuing this 
goal, PMCs may be tempted to reduce costs by delivering inadequate services to the 
client (Singer 2002). Brown and Root, a PMC contracted by the United States military 
during the Balkans conflict, both failed to deliver and overcharged for services on several 
contracts through the desire to reduce costs and increase profit margins (Singer 2002). 
Second, the propensity to secure long-term profits can be offset by the firm’s 
desire to maintain a reputable image (Singer 2002; 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 
2012). PMCs are incentivized to uphold their contracts and complete them in a timely 
manner (Singer 2003). This argument is grounded in the assumption that the reputation of 
the firm is a factor in the likelihood of attracting and maintaining future business. Any 
harm to the PMC’s reputation may lead to the firm’s being unable to compete in a 
growing market for security services and to maintain profitability (Singer 2002; 2003). 
PMCs can gain an undesirable reputation through a variety of methods. This can include 
shirking, the inability to complete a contract or abandoning it altogether, and the 
purposeful extending the length of the conflict to engage in profit maximization (Singer 
2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). In addition, PMCs may refuse to provide 
services altogether and enter into noncompliance of the contractual terms. (Singer 2003). 
Third, if faced with no reputational costs, I assume PMCs will prolong the 
duration of conflict in the pursuit of maximizing profits (Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and 
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Radziszewski 2012). Previous literature has indicated that PMCs can heighten or prolong 
conflict within the host state by contracting with the client’s opposition and maintaining 
the future extraction rights of a natural resource used as payment (Francis 1999; Sherman 
2000; Berman and Florquin 2005). Because PMCs operate in the security services 
market, these firms depend on the existence of security threats, and the creation of new 
ones, to maintain profitability (Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). This 
encourages the PMC to pursue its own self-interest instead of addressing the security 
interests of the client (Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). During the 
1997-1999 conflict with the Eritreans, the government of Ethiopia contracted the services 
of a Russian PMC in providing an air force (Singer 2002; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 
2012). Unknown to Ethiopia, because employees of the Russian PMC were also 
contracted by the Eritreans, the firm refused to fully engage the opposition (Singer 2002). 
As a result, by withholding information from the Ethiopian government, the PMC may 
have extended the length of this conflict. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that not all security services offered by PMCs 
are as equally effective in increasing the military capabilities and responsiveness of the 
government’s standing forces (Petersohn 2017). However, my theoretical mechanisms do 
not distinguish between the security services contracted by the client. Because contracts 
between PMCs and the client are difficult to obtain and can include covert operations, it 
is often difficult to identify the specific service or contractual terms negotiated between 
the two parties (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). Instead, I examine the general 
presence of PMCs on conflict duration, regardless of the type of services provided. 
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Previous literature (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012) finds that competition 
among PMCs, when hired by governments, decreases the duration of conflict. However, 
the authors’ explanation does not account for the effects of power aggregation and 
informational asymmetry. In turn, I explore the effect of PMCs on conflict duration when 
hired by governments. I propose that these actors decrease the duration of conflict by 
increasing the military strength of the government. In addition, I argue that conflict 
duration may also be affected by informational asymmetry, although this effect may be 
heavily moderated by governments. 
During March 1993, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola) forces captured oil facilities within the Angolan coastal town of Soyo (Singer 
2003). The rebel forces, unwilling to relinquish the drilling equipment to the state, soon 
became the target of Executive Outcomes – a PMC hired by the Angolan government to 
recapture the town and reclaim the leased drilling assets on behalf of the respective 
banking institutions (Singer 2003). Executive Outcomes, with only 80 commandos, 
launched an assault on the occupied oil facilities and successfully forced the retreat of the 
UNITA forces (Singer 2003). The competence and efficiency of Executive Outcomes, 
during their initial involvement with the Angolan government, eventually paved the way 




First, as with the case of Executive Outcomes within Angola, PMCs can increase 
the military effectiveness of government forces and aid in the fight against rebel groups, 
thereby reducing the duration of conflict (Millett et al. 1986; Petersohn 2017). This 
occurs because the capabilities of the PMC increase government superiority over the 
rebel group, as illustrated in Figure 1. In turn, this further increases the balance-of-power 
ratio between the government and the rebel group, a key determinant in the duration of 
conflict, more in favor of the government (Bennett and Stam 1996). With greater forces 
at their disposal, the government can quickly and effectively contain and eliminate rebel 
opposition. Because of this, I assume governments are always more capable than their 




















FIGURE 1: GOVERNMENT HIRING OF PMC
Established Power PMC Power
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The greatest effects on conflict duration should occur when the “force ratio” is 
immediately outside of parity (Bennett and Stam 1996, 251). However, as the force ratio 
moves away from parity, there are suggested diminishing marginal returns on the 
reduction of conflict duration resulting from further increases in military power 
(Organski and Kugler 1980; Bennett and Stam 1996). This is not to be interpreted as 
extending the duration of conflict evenly for each additional increase in the ratio, but that 
additional increments in military power result in less of an effect on decreasing conflict 
duration (Bennett and Stam 1996). Although the above argument is traditionally applied 
to interstate conflict, the same effect is suggested to occur within intrastate conflicts 
(Cunningham and Lemke 2013). 
Second, informational asymmetries between the PMC and government may 
influence conflict duration; however, I expect this to have a minimal effect on states. This 
occurs because states have structural characteristics and practices, unlike rebel groups, 
who can allow for the mitigation of informational asymmetry (Zartman 1996; Gent 
2011). Governments accomplish this by (1) utilizing strategic privatization to force the 
PMC in eliminating government opposition and receive payment and (2) investing in 
greater levels of monitoring to ensure contract completion. Additionally, because states 
are sovereign entities, governments can enter enforceable contracts with PMCs 
(Dickinson 2003). Nondeliverance of the contractual terms, or shirking, can be met with 
legal repercussions (Dickinson 2003). Being mindful of reputation, PMCs will then 
quickly and efficiently execute the terms of the contract. 
State governments, in incentivizing PMCs to fulfill the terms of their contract, 
have the ability to use market-based incentives to ensure a satisfactory level of 
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completion (Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012; Kramer 2017). One 
incentive measure is strategic privatization: when a government trades, as payment, a 
natural resource located within enemy territory (Singer 2002; 2003; Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012; Kramer 2017). In order to receive payment, the private military firm 
must locate and eliminate the government’s opposition (Singer 2002; 2003). Entering into 
such an agreement, let alone allocating resources towards its completion, could be 
interpreted as a form of formal commitment to the completion of the contract’s 
negotiated terms due to the potential losses the firm may incur if it were to fail or void the 
terms of the contract. Because firms seek to maximize profits, they are inclined to 
effectively deliver upon the terms of the contract. 
Strategic privatization seems to be limited in its use to state governments (Singer 
2003). This could be for a variety of reasons, but the most notable involves the legal 
ownership of the natural resource (Singer 2003). For example, in order to protect 
reputation and profits, the PMC may only work with the legally and internationally 
recognized government of a state. Because only governments have legal ownership of the 
natural resources within state borders (Singer 2003), this can be used as leverage in 
controlling the propensity for PMCs to shirk or maximize profits with disregard for the 
client’s security interests. 
The Wagner Group, a Russian PMC fighting in the Syrian Civil War, is noted as 
having been incentivized through the Syrian government’s use of strategic privatization 
to capture territory controlled by the Islamic State (Kramer 2017). In particular, the 
Wagner Group’s contract with the Syrian government stipulated that this corporation was 
to be awarded a share of the oil and mining rights seized from the Islamic State as 
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payment for successful completion of the contract and its negotiated terms (Kramer 
2017). 
Due to the government’s unique relationship with territory, the issue of 
informational asymmetry may be further lessened. Territory controlled by the state holds 
significant importance to the government, for both tangible and intangible reasons – 
including wealth and strategic value (Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996; Hensel and Mitchell 
2005). Because of the value associated with this territory, these areas hold salience within 
the government (Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). This ensures 
both government interest and a level of monitoring within the region occupied by rebel 
groups. Because strategic privatization requires PMCs to eliminate government 
opposition before controlling the natural resource and collecting payment (Singer 2002; 
2003), even the weakest governments, because of their interest in the territory, can 
acknowledge when the PMC has competed the contract and its negotiated terms. 
Furthermore, unlike rebel groups, governments can enter legally binding contracts 
with PMCs (Dickinson 2003). Governments may enhance monitoring capabilities by 
legally requiring the PMC to abide by international and humanitarian laws and obtain 
accreditations from independent organizations (Dickinson 2003). Furthermore, 
governments may include contractual termination provisions to remedy the profit 
maximizing nature of PMCs who choose to shirk, enter noncompliance, or violate 
international and humanitarian law (Dickinson 2003). Because state governments are 
legally recognized, claims can be heard in adjudication courts – a luxury rebel groups do 
not possess (Dickinson 2003). 
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In conclusion, by contracting the security service of PMCs, states experience an 
increase in military power. This allows governments to tilt the balance-of-power to their 
advantage and accelerate the time until conflict cessation. In addition, governments of 
weak and failed states can offset the propensity of PMCs to maximize profits by 
increasing the length of conflict through the exploitation of informational asymmetry. 
This is accomplished through the government’s use of strategic privatization and the 
government’s ability to enforce the contract and its negotiated terms. Because of these 
factors, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If hired by a state government, private military firms will decrease the 
duration of a conflict. 
 
REBEL GROUP CLIENTS 
Despite finding no relationship between competition among PMCs and rebel 
groups on conflict duration (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012), current literature 
largely ignores the mechanisms by which PMCs influence conflict duration when 
contracted by a rebel group. I explore how rebel group contracting of a PMC affects the 
duration of conflict. Through a change in power aggregation between government forces 
and the rebel group, due to the security services provided by the PMC, I argue that rebel 
groups move towards parity with government forces. In addition, because rebel groups 
are largely unprofessional in nature, PMCs may exploit the informational asymmetry 
between themselves and the group. 
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In 1989, former Israeli Defense Force officers, associated with Hod Hahanit, a 
PMC whose name roughly translates from Hebrew as “Glory of the Spear,” trained 
Colombian paramilitaries associated with the state’s drug cartels and death squads 
(Singer 2001). After receiving training in military tactics and sophisticated weaponry, the 
paramilitaries were later involved in the assassination of two Colombian presidential 
candidates and the bombing of a civilian airliner (Singer 2001). The security services 
provided by Hod Hahanit increased the military effectiveness of the rebel group, allowing 
them to effectively campaign against the government. 
First, PMCs expand the military power of rebel groups and increase the duration 
of conflict. As seen in Figure 2, by contracting the security services of a PMC and 
increasing the military effectiveness of the standing forces, rebel groups can diminish the 
superiority of the government. This reorients the balance-of-power between the rebel 
group and the government, moving the force-ratio closer to parity. In turn, because the 
rebel group’s military capabilities become more balanced with that of the government, 















Because rebel groups are structurally disadvantaged when compared to the state, 
PMCs will seek to exploit the group. In other words, rebel groups experience greater 
informational asymmetry while employing the services of a PMC when compared to the 
governments of weak and failed states. This occurs because governments can minimize 
their informational asymmetry through structural factors and the use of strategic 
privatization. Unlike governments of weak and failed states, rebel groups do not hold 
international legitimacy and sovereignty (Gent 2011). Because of this, rebel groups 
cannot legally offer natural resources as payment by utilizing strategic privatization 
(Singer 2003). However, rebel groups may offer captured or held natural resources as 
payment for the services provided by a PMC. 
Second, the lack of professionalism of most rebel groups makes them vulnerable 
to exploitation by PMCs. Rebel groups, when compared to the forces of governments and 
PMCs, are often highly unorganized because of forced recruitment, inadequate training, 














FIGURE 2: REBEL GROUP HIRING OF PMC
Established Power PMC Power
26 
 
inconsistent discipline, and a drive for looting (Gates 2002). Unlike government forces, 
compliance is often maintained through the minimum “allocation of pecuniary rewards” 
obtained through looting and other financial means (Gates 2002, 119). These 
characteristics, when faced with the polish and professionalism of PMCs, imply that 
informational asymmetry exists between the rebel groups and the PMC. Because of these 
factors, PMCs are expected to exploit the rebel group by withholding information and 
prolonging conflict duration to maximize profits. 
 In conclusion, rebel-contracted PMCs are anticipated to increase the duration of a 
conflict. This occurs because the contracting of a PMC allows rebel groups to achieve 
parity, or near parity, with government forces. Additionally, rebel groups lack the 
structural characteristics, professionalism, and resources required to reduce the 
informational asymmetry with the PMC. Because of these two factors, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If hired by a rebel group, private military companies will increase the 






METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
I adopt the data and basic methodology of Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) 
to analyze the effect of PMCs on African civil wars from 1990-2008. The focus of these 
data is not freelance mercenaries or groups of soldiers – but instead the modern-day 
PMC. I analyze the post-Cold War era because PMCs within this period are described as 
having structure, organization, reputational awareness, and a variety of security services 
(Musah and Fayemi 2000; Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). Modern-
day PMCs are corporations with permanent locations and specified internal regulations 
(Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). Before 1990, PMCs “were often ad-
hoc groupings of former soldiers” and behaved substantially differently from their 
modern-day counterparts (Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). This 
distinction is important because the inclusion of mercenaries and spontaneous makeshift 
groups would introduce measurement bias into the data due to fundamental differences in 
behavior between these actors and PMCs. The behaviors of these groups often include 
obtaining individual contracts directly from clients and not being subject to common 
institutional rules or norms – behaviors PMCs are unlikely to condone 
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(Singer 2003; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012).  
 Following Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012), I narrow the focus of this 
analysis to African states because of the concentration of PMCs within the region and to 
limit the scope of analysis to a manageable level. This region attracts the greatest number 
of PMCs due to an abundance of weak states within the region and the high likelihood of 
armed conflict among rival factions (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). In addition, 
because of limited international and regional involvement, governments of weak states 
often rely upon the security services provided through PMCs (Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012). In turn, this has aided in the expansion of PMCs throughout the 
region (Olonisakin 2000; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). However, because PMCs 
tend to operate in weak states experiencing political and economic failure, such as the 
case with locations outside of Africa, the data should be generalizable and representative 
of other civil conflicts involving the use of a PMC (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; 
Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable is the duration of civil conflict in African states from 
1990-2008. Duration, measured in years, is a continuous variable with values ranging 
from a minimum of one year to the maximum of sixteen years; with an average length of 
4.3 years. The COW dataset does not include right censored cases – meaning no conflicts 
are considered ongoing after 2008. Data for this variable is available through the 
Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War Dataset, 1818-2007 (v4.0) (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010). Although the COW dataset fails to measure civil conflicts with low 
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battle-related deaths, these data are preferred because the UCDP/PRIO data do not make 
strong determinations regarding the start and end dates of conflicts. I follow the 
methodology of Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) and include conflicts beginning 
before 1990 that are still considered ongoing in 1990 – allowing for the full conflict to be 
measured instead of a portion of its duration.  
The COW data defines civil war as involving “the government of the state against 
a non-state entity” (Sarkees 2010, 2). Intrastate conflicts must include sustained combat 
involving the use of organized armed forces and result in a minimum of 1,000 battle-
related deaths within a one year period (Sarkees 2010). To be considered a participant in 
the conflict, state governments must either commit 1,000 soldiers to the conflict or suffer 
100 battle-related deaths per year (Sarkees 2010). Non-state entities are required to 
commit a minimum of 100 personnel or suffer at least twenty-five battle-related deaths 
per year (Sarkees 2010). Conflicts within the COW dataset are considered as ended when 
fatalities fall below the required threshold (Sarkees 2010). The original data had 135 
observations, which encompass thirty-three conflicts, and fifteen African states. I 
dropped twelve observations with missing and incorrect values. The data now have 123 
observations and encompass twenty-eight conflicts within fourteen African states. These 
observations, civil war/state/year, comprise my unit of analysis. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The main independent variable is the presence and provision of security services 
by a PMC within the state experiencing civil conflict. Data for this variable are derived 
from Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski’s (2012) measure of PMC competition, who built 
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their data by utilizing information from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
reports from 1990-1999. The authors supplement the data with various sources, including 
newspaper articles, books, reports, blogs, and contracts to update the data to 2008. To 
ensure the reliability of the dataset, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) consulted with 
country experts to verify the information, in addition to having multiple individuals 
collect data on the same conflict. I dichotomize the author’s variables for PMC 
competition to indicate whether a PMC was present within the state on behalf of either 
the government or rebel group. This variable, varying over time, includes 5 civil wars 
where a PMC did not remain present for the entire duration of a conflict on behalf of a 
government, and 2 where a PMC did not remain present for the entire duration of a 
conflict on behalf of a rebel group. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 I control for nine variables known to impact conflict duration; the first being 
proportion of forces. Cunningham et al. (2009) discuss the importance of the mobilization 
capacity for both rebel and government actors. The ability to mobilize or draft 
preponderant forces pressures the opposition and creates the opportunity to engage in 
direct attack (Cunningham et al. 2009). This variable is calculated by dividing 
government forces by rebel forces. Data for government forces is derived from two 
sources; the COW National Material Capabilities dataset (v4.0) (Singer et al. 1972) for 
the years 1990-2001 and data provided by the World Bank Indicators (World Bank 2011) 
for 2001-2008. Data on the size of rebel forces is provided by Cunningham et al. (2009). 
I log transform this variable to account for the diminishing effect of higher government 
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ratios. I expect the duration of conflict to be shorter when the proportion of government 
forces is larger than rebel forces. 
 Second, I account for the level of ethnic fractionalization within the state. The 
empirical findings on the significance of ethnic fractionalization are mixed (Fearon 
2004). Collier et al. (2004) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) find support for 
intermediate levels of ethnic diversity increasing conflict duration. Balch-Lindsay and 
Enterline (1999), although using a different measure of ethnic fractionalization, find no 
significant relationship regarding its effect on conflict duration. Fearon and Latin (2003) 
find states with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization are prone to experiencing 
increased risk for civil conflict. As the number of ethnic groups increases, brokering an 
agreement acceptable to all parties becomes increasingly implausible, and issues of 
commitment among individuals become volatile (Fearon 2004; Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012).  
Despite the mixed empirical evidence, I expect ethnic fractionalization to prolong 
conflict duration through hampering conflict resolution, as suggested by Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski (2012). Data for this variable are derived from Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
and is measured as the probability that two randomly-drawn people in a state are from 
different ethnic groups. Values near 0 represent a homogenous society, and those close to 
1 indicate more heterogeneous states (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Important to note, this 
variable does not vary over time and was not logged due to the dichotomy of the variable.  
Third, I control for state GDP per capita. I expect higher levels of GDP per capita 
to decrease conflict duration. Previous research (Collier et al. 2004) provides some 
support for GDP per capita as being negatively associated with conflict duration. As GDP 
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per capita increases, opportunity costs for rebellion becomes higher while state capacity 
to combat rebellion increases (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), thus 
reducing conflict duration. I create this variable by using the Penn World Table (v6.3) 
(Heston et al. 2009). In addition, this variable is log transformed. 
Fourth, I control for the type of issues involved within civil wars. Conflicts fought 
over ethnic issues are difficult to resolve due to nationalist rhetoric cementing group 
cleavages. In turn, these ethnic issues then create difficulty for intergroup dialogue to 
emerge (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). This increases the duration of conflict by 
leading to an increase in distrust among ethnic groups and intensifying the security 
dilemma (Kaufmann 1996). Derived from Cunningham (2006), this variable is 
dichotomous and measured by determining the level of cohesiveness of group leadership 
over the course of the conflict. 
 Fifth, I control for regime type and expect democratic regimes to be associated 
with prolonged conflict duration. Previous research (Cunningham et al. 2009; Buhaug et 
al. 2009) has found that conflict duration differs between democracies and 
nondemocracies. Although seemingly counter-intuitive, democracies are expected to 
experience longer conflicts than nondemocracies because of a reluctance “to apply 
massive military force to quell” government opposition (Cunningham et al. 2009; Buhaug 
et al. 2009, 563). I measure this by using scores from the Polity2 variable available from 
the Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2019). I use this variable because it allocates regime 
scores for those instances in which the original Polity variable might measure cases of 
interruption, interregnum, and transition. This reduces the number of missing 
observations that would otherwise occur. 
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Sixth, I control for the intensity of conflict. Previous research (Regan 2002a; 
2002b) has indicated intensity, measured by the number of battle deaths per year, as 
influencing conflict duration. Conflicts of increasing intensity are expected to decrease 
the duration of conflict by “creating a mutually hurting stalemate” and encouraging 
negotiations between the warring parties (Regan 2002a; 2002b; Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012, 808). In measuring this variable, I utilize the UCDP/PRIO Battle 
Deaths Dataset Version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). This variable is dichotomous 
and measures the intensity of conflicts; wars with 25-999 battle-related deaths are 
measured as “0” and those with 1,000 or more are measured as “1”. 
 Seventh, I account for a state’s mountainous terrain. Terrain is a central 
component of military strategy used by both governments and rebel groups. Mountainous 
terrains serve as safe haven for rebels to hide and prolong conflict by obstructing the 
government’s ability to achieve victory (Fearon and Latin 2003; Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski 2012). I expect this variable to increase the duration of conflict. This 
variable, derived from Fearon and Latin 2003, is measured by calculating the proportion 
of the state that is mountainous. This variable is log transformed. 
 Last, I control for third-party support of both the government and rebel groups. 
Empirical studies find simultaneous third-party interventions to increase conflict duration 
and to provide warring parties with continued motivation to engage in conflict (Regan 
2002b; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012). Biased interventions in support of one 
party decrease conflict duration (Regan 2002b). The data for these two variables are 
derived from Cunningham et al. (2009) and is dichotomous, indicating whether third 




Because I analyze the impact of the independent variable in determining the duration of 
conflict, the use of a survival model is the preferred method. To test my hypotheses, I 
will utilize a Cox proportional hazard model. Parametric models, such as the Weibull 
model, apply restrictive assumptions on the dependent variable (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 1997). However, because I do not make assumption regarding the survival rate of 
civil conflicts with the data, the Cox model is recommended in estimating the time until 
conflict termination. Given the model, I test the proportional hazards assumption and find 
no violations regarding any of the variables used within this analysis.  
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
As shown below, Figure 3 describes the average duration of all civil conflicts 
included within this analysis. In addition, Figure 4 illustrates the survival rate for civil 
conflicts where government or rebel forces contract a PMC. The figure shows civil 
conflicts involving the use of a government contracted PMC as being shorter than those 
where no PMC is present. In fact, half of these conflicts are shown to be over within four 
years. Of the eight conflicts where the government contracts the security services of a 
PMC, the average duration is 2.5 years. The twenty-six conflicts where the government 
does not contract a PMC last an average of 4.5 years. Additionally, a similar relationship 
is shown for rebel groups’ contracting a PMC. Civil conflicts with a PMC are shorter in 
duration compared to those where no PMC present. These four conflicts involving rebel 
contracting of a PMC have an average duration of 1.25 years. Of the twenty-six civil 
conflicts without rebel contracting of a PMC, the average duration of a conflict is 4.7 
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years. Furthermore, Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used 
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While Figure 4 suggests PMCs may affect conflict duration, it is important to note 
that this effect might not be causal. For instance, conflicts involving the contracting of a 
PMC could be different from those where security services are not provided. For 
example, the firm, concerned about its reputation, may only enter conflicts they perceive 
as having minimal risk. This is to ensure that the PMC emerges as the victor and to limit 
the danger to its deployed assets (Singer 2002; 2003). On the other hand, this relationship 
may be causal, suggesting that PMCs do affect conflict duration, thus warranting further 
investigation. 
In addition, although Figure 4 showcases an interesting narrative, it merely 
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consider the effects of other variables. Table 2 presents the results of a multivariate 
survival analysis testing the impact of PMC presence on conflict duration. I use hazard 
ratios for the coefficients of my model; these are interpreted on whether the values 
exceed 1 (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). Ratios 
greater than 1 are interpreted as the variable increasing the risk of failure – or the 
shortening of conflict duration. Hazard ratios less than 1 indicate a decrease in the risk of 
failure – or the prolonging of civil conflict. 
 
Table 1. Statistics                     
               
Variables       rho   chi2   Degrees of Freedom   Prob>chi2 
               
PMC Presence 
Government  0.142  0.95  1  0.329 
               
PMC Presence Rebel 
Group  0.043  0.16  1  0.69 
               
GDP per capita   0.104  0.32  1  0.572 
               
Ethnic Fractionalization  -0.065  0.27  1  0.601 
               
Ethnic Conflict   0.007  0.00  1  0.957 
               
Conflict Intensity   -0.034  0.04  1  0.842 
               
Mountainous Terrain  0.025  0.03  1  0.844 
               
Regime Type   -0.023  0.05  1  0.862 
               
Proportion of Forces  0.031  0.48  1  0.824 
               
Support Government  0.150  1.75  1  0.489 
               
Support Rebel Group  0.099  0.48  1  0.186 
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PMC Presence Government 1.686 
(1.470) 
 
PMC Presence Rebel Group 9.684 
(14.676) 
 
GDP per capita 0.828 
(0.225) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.115 
(0.156) 
 
Ethnic Conflict 0.853 
(0.536) 
 
Conflict Intensity 0.954 
(0.593) 
 
Mountainous Terrain 0.762*** 
(0.053) 
 
Regime Type 1.183*** 
(0.069) 
 
Proportion of Forces 1.173 
(0.152) 
 
Support Government 0.443 
(0.336) 
 






Log Likelihood -76.421 
LR chi2  56.06*** 
Note: Hazard ratios with robust standard errors clustered on group in parentheses 




 Table 2 provides the results from my tests of the two hypotheses. My first 
hypothesis suggested that government contracting of a PMC decreases conflict duration. 
This occurs by augmenting the military power of the government, increasing its 
preponderance over the rebel group. Informational asymmetry, in this case, is 
hypothesized to have a minor, if any, effect. Furthermore, by utilizing enforceable 
contracts, governments can limit PMC noncompliance and shirking. Unfortunately, I find 
no support for this hypothesis as my main independent variable, PMC Presence 
Government fails to achieve significance. 
Although it is difficult to determine the precise cause of this result, the 
possibilities include the use of guerilla warfare by rebel groups and the effect of different 
types of PMC services. Previous literature (Wood et al. 2012) indicates that armed 
intervention, altering the balance-of-power on behalf of government forces, may lead 
rebels to change their tactics. This altering of rebel group behavior then results in the use 
of guerilla warfare and the targeting of civilian populations (Wood et al. 2012). Because 
of these tactics, the government and PMC, working in concert, may be unable to 
effectively combat the hostilities of rebel groups. The mix of these types of conflicts, 
coupled with more traditional civil conflicts in the data, may affect my results. 
Furthermore, (Petersohn 2017) suggests a differential effect between the types of 
security services provided by PMCs. Because my data does not measure the type of 
security services provided by the PMC, this may account for the result see in Table 2. 
Additionally, because there are only eight conflicts involving governmental use of PMCs, 
the data may be limited in that some of these conflicts may include the contracting of 
security services suggested to be less effective in combating rebel opposition. 
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In my second hypothesis, I suggest that rebel contracting of a PMC increases 
conflict duration. In doing so, rebel groups move toward parity with government forces. 
In turn, this increases the duration of conflict by providing the government with a more 
capable adversary. Additionally, because of the limited monitoring capabilities and the 
lack of professionalism within rebel groups, PMCs are prone to exploit their 
informational asymmetry with rebel groups – thus increasing conflict duration. Here too, 
I fail to find support for my main independent variable. 
As with Hypothesis 1, it is difficult to determine the precise cause of this result. 
Possible explanations could include a higher-level of professionalism among rebel groups 
and the small sample of cases within the data involving rebel contracting of PMCs. For 
example, through the exploitation of natural resources, rebel groups have been able to 
acquire the funds required to obtain the services provided by PMCs (Singer 2002; 2003). 
These resources, such as various rare earth minerals, oil and natural gas, and drugs, have 
been recorded as a viable method of constructing a private army or supplementing current 
forces (Singer 2003). For instance, UNITA financed “the private construction and 
maintenance of an entire mechanized field army through a nearly $2 billion diamond 
trade” (Singer 2003, 61). This has allowed non-state actors to gain a nearly-equal, 
militarily-competitive edge with government forces and may indicate a level of 
competence and professionalism within the rebel group. 
Of my nine control variables, only mountainous terrain and regime type are 
significant. With a hazard ratio of 0.762, this suggests an increase in conflict duration of 
23.8% per unit increase. In line with previous literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lujala 
2010), mountainous terrain is found to increase the duration of conflict by providing 
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areas of refuge for rebel groups to reorganize and obstruct government victory through 
evasion, thus increasing the duration of a conflict.  
Contrary to previous research, I find that regime type decreases conflict duration. 
For this variable, the hazard ratio is 1.183, which indicates an 18.3% decrease in conflict 
duration per unit increase. Previous literature (Cunningham et al. 2009; Buhaug et al. 
2009) suggests that democracies experience longer conflicts due to their reluctance to 
issue the utmost force against the opposition. However, the overwhelming number of 
cases in my data are from nondemocratic or anocratic regimes. Because anocracies are 
suggested to be the government type most prone to experiencing civil conflict (Walter 
2004; Muller and Weede 1990; Ellingsen and Gleditsch 1997), this may explain the result 
of the variable. Furthermore, this result may also be the result of the limited variance with 
the regime type variable and the constrained temporal domain of the data, as there is only 








Previous literature has primarily concentrated on the negative aspects associated 
with PMCs. Researchers have thoroughly investigated the relationship between human 
rights violations and the legal status of PMCs under international law, along with the 
methods best able to remedy these dilemmas (Cameron 2006; Carney 2006; Doswald-
Beck 2007). However, a minimal amount of literature has examined the effects of PMCs 
on conflict (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012; Petersohn 2017). As previous literature 
has failed to consider the mere presence of these actors on conflict duration, I sought to 
explore this effect by conducting an empirical analysis on the relationship between PMCs 
and civil conflict duration in Africa.  
I contribute to the current literature by theorizing new and exploring previously-
mentioned, mechanisms by which PMCs may influence conflict duration when 
contracted by a government. Through power aggregation, PMCs are able to increase the 
military power of both government and rebel group clients – thus contributing to conflict 
duration. I propose that government clients, in contrast to rebel groups, are better able to 
offset the propensity for PMCs to exploit the limited monitoring capabilities of the state. 
This occurs through the government’s increased ability to monitor territory, engage in the 
43 
 
use of strategic privatization, and enter legally-binding contracts with negotiated terms. 
In turn, upon government contracting of a PMC, these factors were suggested to reduce 
conflict duration. 
In addition, I theorize the mechanisms by which PMCs may contribute to conflict 
duration when employed by a rebel group. Through an increase in military power, the 
security services provided by the PMC move the rebel group towards parity with 
government forces. In turn, this makes the rebel group a more formidable adversary. 
Furthermore, because most rebel groups lack professionalism, are unable to engage in the 
use of strategic privatization, and are unable to enter legally binding agreements, the 
PMC is expected to exploit their informational asymmetry to engage in the maximization 
of profits. In turn, these theorized mechanisms were hypothesized to increase conflict 
duration. Because previous literature (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012; Petershon 
2017) fails to mention the mechanisms by which PMCs contribute to rebel groups, I 
believe this thesis has taken the necessary steps to begin discussion and promote future 
research among scholars. 
In measuring this relationship, I utilize the COW data and include control 
variables expected to impact conflict duration. Through the use of a multivariate Cox 
proportional hazard model, I find no support for either hypothesis. Despite this, these 
findings contribute to the current literature by suggesting that the mere presence of a 
PMC within civil conflict may not be essential in determining conflict duration. 
Furthermore, because these results are contrary to the findings of Akcinaroglu and 
Radziszewski (2012), these findings may suggest that competition, rather than presence, 
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 Because my data does not measure the type of services offered by PMCs, this 
may be the result of my many contrary findings. Petersohn (2017) describes the 
individual effects of private security services on conflict severity and suggests a 
differential effect. Future research should account for variation in PMC services as this 
could produce meaningful results. Because governments may employ multiple services, 
such as the case with the United States in Afghanistan, this would allow researchers to 
determine the security service most effective in reducing conflict duration. 
 In addition, my data are temporally limited. Because I only measure conflicts 
from 1990 to 2008, the results may not be indicative of all civil wars. There are a number 
of civil conflicts within Africa occurring after 2008, such as in Nigeria (Bayley 2016), 
where governments have contracted the security services of a PMC. As such, these cases 
would provide more cases within the data and could produce fruitful results. Also, the 
cases included within the data should predate 1990, as it is still important to distinguish 
between modern-day PMCs and those of the past. 
Furthermore, the data are limited as it only includes civil conflicts within Africa. 
This reduces the number of conflicts where the security services of a PMC were 
contracted by either government or rebel group forces. While Africa has suffered a 
disproportionate share of civil conflicts since the mid-1990s (Elbadawi and Sambanis 
2000; Blattman and Miguel 2010), making the region suitable for testing theories 
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concerning civil conflict, a broader dataset of cases could allow scholars to determine 
conclusively whether these effects are consistent in a broader range of cases. In addition, 
future data efforts should include insurgencies, as these conflicts often include unique 
features distinguishing themselves from civil conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
  The contracting of PMCs in both international and intrastate conflict has 
increasingly become more common since the 1990s (Singer 2003), and there is no 
indication of a decline in the states’ frequency to utilize private security services. The war 
in Afghanistan is largely built upon contracted military, as further involvement of U.S. 
troops within the region has often been considered “political suicide” for public officials 
(Singer 2002; 2003; McFate 2016). Additionally, with Congress establishing limits on the 
number of U.S. troops which may be deployed to a region, the United States is seemingly 
left to resort to the security services provided by PMCs (McFate 2016). 
 Currently, peace negotiations are underway between U.S. forces and the Taliban 
to end the nearly 20-year war in Afghanistan. During a press conference, President 
Donald Trump commented that it is “time for someone else to do that work [referring to 
the war in Afghanistan]” (BBC News 2020). However, Blackwater and DynCorp, at the 
request of Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner, proposed that the United States should use 
PMCs to “fix” Afghanistan (McFate 2017). With U.S. and allied forces slowly leaving 
the region upon the successful negotiation of the agreement, the possibility exists that 
“someone else” could be PMCs. 
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 Regardless of the United States future strategy in Afghanistan and with the 
continued rise of PMCs throughout the globe, there are many avenues for further 
research. The contracting of private security services by failed or weak states and rebel 
groups has lowered the barriers to achieve military power (Singer 2002; 2003). No longer 
are states required to dedicate the time, the economic resources, or the industry necessary 
to wage conflict (Singer 2002; 2003). Future research must continue to evaluate the 
relationship between the ability of weak states to acquire such services and conflict 
duration as the impacts of intrastate conflicts could have enormous regional and 
international implications. Additionally, future contributions to the literature should not 
be limited to civil or regional conflicts, but instead expand into the use of PMCs by those 
states with considerable and established military strength. For example, future research 
should examine the use of PMCs by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
determine whether private security services had an effect on the duration of those 
insurgencies. 
 Researchers must begin constructing reliable, complete, and comprehensive data 
to properly measure the relationship between PMCs and conflict. Because the utilization 
of PMCs occurs on an international level, this data should include cases of both interstate 
and intrastate conflicts where both governments and rebel groups contract private 
security services. In addition, this data should attempt to expand the temporal and spatial 
range of cases within the data. By measuring conflicts post-2008, and by including cases 
of PMC contracting by governments in the fight against global terrorism, this data would 
capture an increased number of cases that may potentially alter the understanding of 
relationship the between PMCs and conflict. Furthermore, instead of being measured by 
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year, this data could include observations by month. In turn, this would allow for the 
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